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Abstract  
 The cloud computing has been evolved in recent years which led many customers to 
utilize the cloud computing technologies. The research work in this area has spread due to many 
issues that have coincided with the vast growth of the cloud computing technologies. On the other 
hand, the cloud security concern has become one of the important issues that cloud computing introduces. 
One of the main components of cloud services is the service level agreement (SLA) that works as a 
contractual document between the cloud providers and their customers and states some metrics and 
parameters that must be enforced by the cloud providers or consumers. Despite various issues of the SLA 
in cloud computing, there is one issue that has not been discussed frequently in cloud computing security, 
which is the SLA in term of risk management. This research tends to perform SLA-based risk analysis in 
cloud computing environments. Moreover, it evaluates different SLA parameters such the risk factor, the 
response time factor, and the service cost factor. This paper also designates the importance of considering 
risk management as an SLA parameter in the negotiation stage between the provider and the consumer. 
However, it looks for the relation between those SLA metrics and risk factor associated with the cloud 
services.            
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  1. Introduction 
Cloud computing has been one of the major emerging technologies in recent years. Cloud computing 
is based on delivering different services and resources through what is called the cloud or the Internet. 
These services differ from providing infrastructure resources to software services. Cloud computing 
depends on complex architectures that allow providers to deploy different models and deliver different 
services. One of the vast features that cause the spread of these technologies is the flexibility since these 
services and resources can be offered on-demand and the customer only pays according to usage. Also, 
they offer good scalable and elastic features to scale the existing resources to obtain extra resources and 
services on demand. Cloud computing consumers will not need to think about maintenance fees or 
software licenses since those operations will be taken care of by the cloud providers. Moreover, 
significant benefits of cloud computing such as cost effectiveness, portability, usability, and availability 
draw the attention of many consumers to use cloud services. Cloud computing services can be delivered 
in different models such as software-as-a-service (SaaS), which allows cloud customers to process and 
use licensed software on the cloud providers’ resources only. For instance, the cloud consumers rent 
software such as human resources management system (HRMS) and run it in the cloud on the providers’ 
resources. The cloud services can also be provided as platform-as-a-service (PaaS) which lets the 
consumers to rent only a platform that gives more control to the consumer to configure it as needed. The 
last model is infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS), which provides the consumers with a complete 
infrastructure where they deploy different machines and storage resources. The cloud services can be 
deployed in different ways such as public cloud that allows all the consumers to share the same resources, 
private cloud that provides the consumers with detected resources, community cloud that allows two or 
more trusted consumers to share same resources, and hybrid clouds which allow consumer to combine the 
public and private clouds.  
The features of cloud computing entice consumers to utilize the cloud services to improve the 
current computing services and save more money. On the other hand, the cloud security concern has 
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become one of the important issues that cloud computing introduces. Many IT leaders are afraid of 
moving to the cloud because of the security issues that arise from cloud computing technologies. One of 
the main components of using cloud services is the service level agreement (SLA) that works as a 
contractual document between the cloud providers and their customers. Cloud SLA states some metrics 
and parameters that must be enforced by the cloud providers or consumers. If any contractual party fails 
to meet any SLA requirements, that party commits a violation and is obligated to pay some penalties 
according to the SLA. Nonetheless, there are different areas in cloud computing that introduce new risks 
to both the cloud providers and customers. One of the issues that have not been discussed frequently in 
cloud computing security is the SLA in term of risk management. This research tends to perform SLA-
based risk analysis in cloud computing environments.  One of the strengths of this topic is that research 
evaluates different SLA parameters such the risk factor, the response time factor, and the service cost 
factor. The significance of the work conducted is to study the relationship between the risk management 
parameter and other SLA parameters such as response time and the cost. Also, since many SLAs lack 
security and risk management requirements, this research designates the importance of considering risk 
management as an SLA parameter in the negotiation stage between the provider and the consumer. The 
expectation consequences of this research are comparison results of the risk analysis against different 
SLA metrics such as stated response time and service cost. The research finds linkage between those 
metrics and risk factors associated with the cloud services. This topic is very interesting because it 
indicates some risk management issues with the current cloud SLAs. Furthermore, many IT leaders want 
to move to cloud but they face trust problem with the current ways of establishing cloud services’ SLAs. 
Thus, this research gives those leaders some insights into the importance of risk management and how 
they should consider it while deciding the future cloud providers for them.  
The remainder of this paper is constructed as follows. The next section provides background literature 
that relates to the research topic. Next, section 3 summarizes the research methodology used in this 
research. Section 4 then provides data collection and analysis for the SLA factors. Then, section 5 
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discusses the results of section 4 in depth. Some recommendations are provided in section 6 and the 
future work is provided in section 7. Then, the final part contains the conclusions of this research.   
2. Literature Review  
Several researches have been done in the area of SLA and risk management in cloud computing 
environments. Some of these researches tend to provide new SLA risk management models or 
frameworks to overcome security issues associated with the SLA in the cloud. This research focuses on 
an SLA-based risk analysis in cloud computing environments by examining three different SLA factors, 
which are the risk factor associated with the service, the service cost factor, and the response time factor. 
The related work in this area lacks research that concerns the SLA-based risk analysis and this may 
happen because the cloud computing security area has been one of the emerging research areas recently. 
The following parts discuss different research that has been done in the areas of SLA and risk 
management in the cloud computing environments.  
In term of SLA-based work in cloud computing, Alhamad et al [1] proposed various models in 
this area such as an SLA-based trusted model for cloud computing. This model helps cloud consumers to 
evaluate the cloud resources and decides, which resources are more reliable to use. Moreover, Alhamad et 
al [2] also provided SLA framework for cloud computing. This framework provides good criteria that 
helps to build a good SLA in cloud computing and it discusses negotiation strategies between the cloud 
providers and other parties such as a cloud consumer, cloud broker, or SLA’s monitoring agent. Hammadi 
and Hussain [3] proposed a monitoring framework for SLA. This framework helps third party providers 
to monitor SLA in real time to ensure that all parties meet SLA specifications of all time. This framework 
contains two modules: reputation assessment module and transactional risk assessment module and those 
two modules provide real-time QoS assessment to allow consumers to make a good decision by continue 
using the current service or moving to another service provider. Chi et al. [4] offered a data structure 
called “SLA-tree” to support SLA-based decisions in cloud environments. This structure contains two 
different data sets such as a waiting list of queries to be executed and the other set is an SLA for each 
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query, which points out different queries profits for modifying response times for each query. Jahyun Goo 
[5] proposed a framework for structuring SLA in IT outsourcing arrangements. This framework provides 
detailed descriptions of SLA measurement development and accurate statistical validations. This 
framework covers 11 SLA contractual factors and their relationships with three more sub-factors. This 
paper produced a benchmarking tool for SLA structuring efforts. Hedwig et al [6] proposed an SLA 
design for enterprise information systems. This design consists of different state-of-the-art concepts from 
system management and balances the risk with the process cost. This design helps IT leaders to 
understand the correlation between the process cost and the service quality. Bhoj et al [7] introduced 
architecture for SLA management in federated environments. This architecture uses SLAs to share 
selective information within different administrative boundaries. This helps federated clouds’ consumers 
to share, measure, monitor, and ensuring the SLA specifications of the shared services. All those models 
and frameworks include and describe different SLA factors and metrics. The research chooses two of the 
most important factors: the response time and service cost.  Those two factors have high impacts on 
making the decision about choosing the cloud service providers.          
In term of risk management in the cloud computing environments, similarly, many papers 
proposed different frameworks in this area. Zhang et al [8] presented an information security risk 
management framework in cloud environments. This framework presents good insights in understanding 
the critical areas in cloud environments. It helps to identify threats and vulnerabilities and their impacts in 
the cloud environments. Furthermore, this framework discusses the possible actions needed to mitigate 
the risks. Yuqin and Helgesson [9] offered a modified risk management model by integrating the SLA to 
a pre-existing risk management model. This model clarifies the required responsibilities by various parties 
involved in the risk management process. Additionally, this paper presents a method to identify the 
relationship between risks and services and between services and actions. Morin et al [10] presented 
several issues and challenges of SLA and risk management in cloud computing. In this research, a risk 
management framework such as this framework [8] is used to identify and quantify risks in cloud 
computing environments.   
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In term of SLA-based risk assessment and analysis in cloud computing environments, the European 
Network and information Security Agency [11] presented a thorough report about risk assessment in 
cloud environments indicating that the SLAs force better risk management in cloud computing 
environments. Likewise, the Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) [12] indicates in its cloud security guide that 
cloud consumers should engage security departments in the establishment of the SLA so they can enforce 
some security requirements in the SLA. Research has been done in risk analysis in the area of cloud 
computing and SLA, in general. Yeo and Buyya [13] analyzed the resource management policing while 
accomplishing obligated objectives such as, meeting SLA, reliability and profit. This research uses two 
different methods for risk analysis: separate and integrated to identify the effectiveness of resource 
management policies in accomplishing the required objectives. Similarly, Waldman and Mello [14] 
discussed a framework for risk analysis of non-compliance with SLA requirements. This analytical 
framework discusses two different SLA issues: downtime and the number of failure occurrences. 
Moreover, Battré et al [15] presented a risk management process that can be used by grid providers to 
support SLA provisioning. The risk management process in this paper uses FERMA standard [16]. Also, 
risk analysis has been done to examine the relationship between the network availability and availability 
SLA specification [17] and this paper provides methods to control the risk and define availability SLA. 
Yang et al [18] presented a patch management framework based on SLA-driven patch applicability 
analysis, which allows automated analysis and risk assessment for business impact during the patch 
process.  Patel et al [19] provided a mechanism to manage SLAs in cloud computing environments using 
Web Service Level Agreement (WSLA) framework to monitor and enforce the SLAs and they provided a 
real world scenario to evaluate their proposal. Moreover, Hovestadt et al [20] offered a workflow for 
selecting the best cloud resources according to the assessed risks and they provided some measurements 
to calculate different factors to support this workflow. Previous research did not relate or analyze 
information security risk against SLA metrics and specifications as this research intends to do. In term of 
the different techniques that have been used in the previous research, several researches in the area of 
SLA risk management in cloud computing are just providing general frameworks and models to 
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implement the risk management process. Furthermore, most of the risk analysis researches did not 
implement the research scenarios and they did not even simulate them such as Hovestadt et al [20], which 
presented risk analysis based on assumptions. Also, Yeo and Buyya [13] focus on the grid environments 
and they have simulated their environment using GridSim [21] and for cloud environments, it would be 
better to use CloudSim [22] to simulate cloud environments. Nonetheless, this research cannot use 
CloudSim to simulate the test environment due to some limitations in this toolkit regarding response time 
calculations and risk estimations. Correspondingly, Waldman and Mello [14] used the state of art model 
and assumptions to evaluate the risk of non-compliance with SLA requirements. However, this research 
does not match or relate the risk factor with other SLA factor such as the cost or response time. Yeo and 
Buyya [13] claim that the work was able to determine the performance difference in resource 
management policies against a single SLA object or combination of the objects. Moreover, this paper 
presents decent workflow to select resource according to assessed risks and it provided good methods to 
do the measurements and this could be used to calculate the risks and decide the best cloud resource. 
Waldman and Mello [14] state that risk of lack of availability is an essential parameter for the elaboration 
of SLAs.   
In brief, most of those researches discuss the subject of SLA and risk management in general. For 
example, some papers perform risk analysis for SLA as a general concept such as [20] but in grid 
communication not cloud computing. Also, some papers discuss different SLA factor such as availability 
in this paper [17].  Thus, to the best of our knowledge, there is no research has been published that 
performs SLA-based risk analysis for the three SLA factors in cloud computing environments, which 
states the significance of this work. Also, this research is considered a significant work because it 
implements and analyzes SLA-based factors in a real test environment. Since this environment provides 
us with real-time measurements, the research provides factual outcomes. Moreover, this research studies 
the relationship between the SLA parameters: response time, cost and the risk factors. This research also 
declares the importance of including risk factor as an additional SLA parameter in the negotiations 
between the cloud providers and other parties 
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3. Methodology 
This research studies three different factors: service response time factor, service cost factor, and risk 
factor. To acquire the calculation of the three factors, a performance study is done to evaluate the 
response time of different cloud resources. Then, the response time’s result is compared to other results 
received from evaluating the service cost and associated risk with each cloud resource. Then, the risk 
analysis results help us to produce different charts that depict the relation and correlation between the 
three factors.  
Before explaining how to calculate each factor, the research scenarios that are implemented to 
achieve the research objectives are stated first. In this scenario, an external private cloud environment is 
implemented in Amazon AWS. The cloud environment contains different virtual machines that build a 
complete and isolated private cloud in Amazon Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) and the environment 
topology is depicted the cloud setup later in this section. The scenario starts with one virtual machine 
(VM) in this cloud. Next, different tests are performed to gather the results of the average response time, 
service cost, and the associated risk. Then, the VMs are increased by one and same calculations are 
performed against all existing cloud resources. The scenario has up to 10 VMs in total.  
Figure 1 clearly depicts the network design and configuration of the experiment. To establish the 
cloud environment, the virtual private cloud is created using Amazon VPC in the US West (Oregon) 
availability zone [23]. This zone has all the VMs that the tests are run against. First, the first VM is 
created and the calculation is done for all factors against one VM. Then, one VM is added and the 
calculation is performed for each VM. In addition to test server runs from RIT, another VM is acquired in 
another Amazon availability zone (EU Ireland) for testing purposes.     
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Figure 1: Virtual private cloud topology 
 
In the following sections, the three SLA factors are listed and how those factors are calculated: 
Response Time: 
The response time is the time period between initiating request and receiving the response. The 
response time testing in cloud environment helps to provide better cloud resources provision process 
where customers make sure that they receive decent services as declared in the service level agreement 
(SLA). This test also assists to examine the availability of the cloud resources since cloud services should 
be available 24/7 when needed. In this case, this helps to find the relationship between the response time 
factor and risk factor in cloud environments. In cloud environments, when more cloud resources and 
Amazon instances are being added, do the added resources or Amazon instances affect the risk factor? 
This task aims to find clear answers using various test cases to verify whether the risk factor is essential 
or not. Since the environment is built in Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) in Amazon AWS in the US West 
Oregon availability zone, different tests are performed within the VPC and outside the cloud. Those tests 
use Perl client-server codes where the code is placed on each VM to listen on a specific port. On the other 
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hand, the testing server initiates multiple TCP packets and sends them recursively to each VM. Then, the 
code calculates the round trip time between the testing server and each VM. While adding more VMs, the 
server keeps sending the packets to the new VM and calculates the average response time the VMs. For 
each VM, the test server sends 100 packets and finds the average of the response time that it receives 
from each VM. In this part, the response time is evaluated from three different physical locations: same 
subnet, another Amazon availability zone, and from RIT campus.  
 On the other hand, end-to-end delay response time test is performed between all VMs. In this 
case, this study assumes that a customer initiates a service request and that request passes all the cloud 
resources. The response time needed to pass all the VMs is calculated. The first case is to assume that the 
last cloud recourse executes the request while the second case requires the last cloud recourse to respond 
to the customer with some feedback.         
Service Cost: 
In this metric, this research examines how the cost factor can be exaggerated in cloud 
environments while utilizing more cloud resources. One of the main benefits of cloud environments is to 
use less physical resources and utilize more virtual resources. In general, the cloud environments reduce 
the IT expenses due to cutting the cost of physical resources, manpower, maintenance and operations. 
 Risk Factor: 
In this part, the research uses the information security risk management framework [8] to calculate 
different risks associated with each VM. This framework helps us to do risk assessment for this study 
scenario by following some standards. This part aims to identify the level of risks associated with each 
VM in cloud environment. After the risk analysis results are acquired, the charts are created to illustrate 
the risk behavior in this study scenario. More detailed steps of the risk assessment and all formulas are 
provided in section 4.3.  
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4. Data collection and analysis 
4.1. Response time factor analysis 
Amazon does not clearly state its average response time for Amazon EC2 instances to respond to a 
network request. It only claims that any instances opened through console will respond in a high manner 
[24]. To acquire the response time for each VM, this research performs three different test cases as the 
following:  
4.1.1. Response time test within the same VPC subnet 
In this case, this study runs a response time test within the same subnet of the cloud 
infrastructure. It launches a VM for testing in the same Amazon availability zone (US West Oregon). 
Then, the test server performs a response time test and sends the TCP testing packets. In average, the test 
server has sent about 100 packets per VM. Table 1 illustrates the average response time results while 
increasing the VMs one after another: 
VM# IP Average Response time 
(Millisecond second) 
1 10.10.10.50 0.446832 
2 10.10.10.51 0.363171 
3 10.10.10.52 0.282536 
4 10.10.10.53 0.438948 
5 10.10.10.54 0.429387 
6 10.10.10.55 0.425957 
7 10.10.10.56 0.371176 
8 10.10.10.57  0.407007 
9 10.10.10.58 0.429922 
10 10.10.10.59 0.440493 
Table 1: Average response time within the subnet 
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Figure 2 shows the fluctuation of the response time factor. First, it has a minor drop at the beginning 
of the test. Then, the response time goes up until it remains steady for a while. Then, the response time of 
a VM within the subnet becomes constant, yet there is no clear reason for the first drop except the 
network connection delay.       
  
Figure 2: Average response time within the subnet 
4.1.2. Response time test from different Amazon availability zone 
In this test, the test server performs a test within the Amazon datacenters. Another VM is set up in a 
different availability zone, which is the Amazon Europe datacenter in Ireland. This test helps to find the 
response time between two availability zones at Amazon AWS: the US West Oregon and EU Ireland. 
Like the previous test, the test server sends multiple TCP packets and finds the average response time of 
each VM. To access the VMs, a public IP is associated to each VM so it can be publicly accessed. Due to 
the limitation of the VPC services at Amazon AWS, Amazon limits the cloud to use only five public IPs 
in each availability zone. Accordingly, the five IPs are kept switching between the 10 VMs. Table 2 
illustrates the test results while increasing the VMs one after another: 
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VM# IP Average Response time (second) 
1 50.112.141.143 0.171669144 
2 50.112.133.99 0.172128291 
3 50.112.141.143 0.169796751 
4 50.112.141.159 0.168599153 
5 50.112.141.158 0.168717644 
6 50.112.141.105 0.169784105 
7 50.112.133.99 0.172184668 
8 50.112.141.143 0.170136806 
9 50.112.141.158 0.169683541 
10 50.112.141.159 0.169808068 
Table 2: Average response time from other Amazon availability zone 
Figure 3 depicts the response time factor behavior when this study tests the private cloud from 
another available zone at Amazon. It is clear from the chart that the response time factor has a dramatic 
decrease at the beginning. Later, the response time has fluctuated for the remaining part of the test and 
fluctuation is around average response time of 0.17 second. The possible reason for this behavior can be 
explained as the connection spends more time to be constructed between two availability zones.  
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Figure 3: Average response time from other Amazon availability zone 
4.1.3. Response time test from RIT network 
In this test case, the test server performs a test from RIT network in Rochester, New York. This 
test helps to examine the response time between the customer network and the cloud resources over the 
Internet. It shows how the connection performance is an important factor when a customer may decide to 
move to cloud environments. Similar to the previous case, there are only five public IPs that can be 
associated with the VMs. Thus, the five IPs are exchanged between the VMs to perform the test. Table 3 
illustrates the test results while increasing the VMs one after another:  
VM# IP Average Response time (second) 
1 50.112.141.143 0.09251992799 
2 50.112.141.105 0.09008345127 
3 50.112.133.99 0.08998443381 
4 50.112.141.159 0.09228640373 
5 50.112.141.158 0.09050016762 
6 50.112.141.105 0.08957309722 
7 50.112.133.99 0.08996924911 
8 50.112.141.143 0.09210723337 
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9 50.112.141.158 0.09455870107 
10 50.112.141.159 0.09595080172 
Table 3: Average response time from RIT 
To illustrate the response time behavior while connected from RIT, Figure 4 indicates a 
fluctuation in response time between 0.089 to 0.092 second. Then, the response time went up significantly 
while adding more VMs. This behavior demonstrated that adding more VMs could affect the response 
time factor based on the physical location of the new VMs. 
 
Figure 4: Average response time from RIT 
To compare between the test cases, Figure 5 shows the enormous difference between the subnet 
case and other cases. Connecting within the subnet cannot compare to the connection outside the private 
network. Thus, interactions between the cloud resources at the same subnet are considered very fast and 
provide better cloud resources availability. On the other hand, the response time for the Amazon 
availability zone and RIT test cases are slightly close and have the same fluctuation around 0.17 seconds 
for the Amazon and 0.91 seconds for the RIT case. Moreover, the comparison illustrates that the 
connection from a regular US network, such as RIT, is faster than the connection from Amazon 
datacenter overseas (Ireland) to the VMs in US. Even though Amazon provides high-speed connection 
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between all its datacenters, the physical location of the datacenters play an important role since the other 
datacenters help in term of data recovery, business continuity, and backup process. Beside the response 
time factor effect, using multiple datacenters help to reduce the risk of data loss and cloud resources 
availability. Figure 5 depicts the average response times of each case are almost constant with minor 
fluctuations at some points. Thus, this chart declares that placing the VMs at the same physical machine 
and same availability zone would provide a constant response time for each VM.      
                
 
Figure 5: Comparison between the test cases 
4.1.4. End-to-end response time delay between the VMs: 
In this test case, this study assumes that a customer issues a service request that goes through each 
VM consecutively. The customer requests a service as illustrated in Figure 6, then, the request goes to 
VM #1. Next, the request is sent to VM #2 by VM#1 and so on until the request reaches the VM #10. 
After the last VM executes the request, VM #10 either responds to the customer or exits the process.  
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Figure 6: End-to-end response time delay for a service request 
In this part, this study aims to calculate the response time that a request takes from the customer 
network until it executes by the last cloud node i.e. VM #10 in this case. In this calculation, the study 
assumes that the request has different process time at each VM. Thus, the response time between the 
cloud nodes in this scenario is only calculated.  
VM# Request Source Request Destination Average Response 
Time (second) 
!"#$%&#  !"#$%&#"  !"#$  !"  !  !"#$"%&!!   
1 RIT (129.21.145.248) VM1 (50.112.153.2) 0.07328167828 0.07328167828 
2 VM1 (10.10.10.50)  VM2 (10.10.10.51) 0.00041709524 0.07369877352 
3 VM2 (10.10.10.51)  VM3 (10.10.10.52) 0.00037762613 0.07407639965 
4 VM3 (10.10.10.52) VM4 (10.10.10.53) 0.00044880732 0.07452520697 
5 VM4 (10.10.10.53) VM5 (10.10.10.54) 0.00037919998 0.07490440695 
6 VM5 (10.10.10.54)  VM6 (10.10.10.55) 0.00049640915 0.0754008161 
7 VM6 (10.10.10.55)  VM7 (10.10.10.56) 0.0003716199 0.075772436 
8 VM7 (10.10.10.56)  VM8 (10.10.10.57) 0.00035345077 0.07612588677 
9 VM8 (10.10.10.57) VM9 (10.10.10.58) 0.00037232553 0.0764982123 
10 VM8 (10.10.10.58) VM10 (10.10.10.59) 0.00036345005 0.07686166235 
RIT VM10 (10.10.10.59)  RIT (129.21.145.248) 0.07356992959 0.15043159194 
Average response time of a request 0.15043159194 
Table 4: End-To-End response time delay between the VMs 
       
	   17	  
To analyze the data in Table 4, the research assumes two different cases: the first case is to 
consider the request needs to be sent by the customer to the cloud resources. The request passes each VM 
until the VM # 10. Then, the VM #10 does not need to take any action and the research assumes the 
request has been fulfilled. Figure 7 shows that response time of a request that finally fulfilled by VM 
#10. The change in the response time is steady increasing while adding more VMs.        
 
Figure 7: Average response time delay between the VMs 
 The second case is to assume that the last VM #10 responds to the customer. In this case, this 
study calculates the response time between the last VM and the customer network. Figure 8 clearly 
illustrates the important effect in response time when the last VM responds to the customer request. A 
sharp increase the response time after VM #10 indicates the enormous impact in the performance if the 
service provider decides to respond to the customers. Thus, processing the request inside the cloud would 
need minimal time besides adding final response time to the customer. Moreover, this behavior states the 
importance of considering the response time between the external network and cloud network; this 
includes the responses to the customers who are located in an external network.      
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Figure 8: Average response time delay between the VMs including RIT 
4.2. Cost factor analysis 
All the cloud resources costs in this analysis are acquired from the Amazon AWS pricing policy 
[25]. There is no minimum fee required and the price depends only on the hourly usage. All the used 
Amazon instances are on-demand instances, hence; the test is charged for the usage time only. 
Additionally, all prices are based on the availability zone, which is the US West Oregon and all the VMs 
are Small type. The following table shows how the cost factor keeps increasing while adding the VMs 
successively:  
VM# OS Price per Hour Subtotal price per Hour 
1 Linux $0.080 $0.080 
2 Linux $0.080 $0.160 
3 Linux $0.080 $0.240 
4 Win $0.115 $0.355 
5 Linux $0.080 $0.435 
6 Win $0.115 $0.550 
7 Linux $0.080 $0.630 
8 Win $0.115 $0.745 
9 Win $0.115 $0.860 
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10 Win $0.115 $0.975 
Table 5: Cost factor behavior  
Figure 9 depicts the cost factor behavior. The cost factor rises gradually when while adding more 
cloud resources. Nonetheless, the chart indicates how cloud environment can be incredibly cost effective. 
For instance, the test cases contain 10 servers that run for an hour and the total cost for all test cases is 
almost one dollar.  
 
 
Figure 9: Cost factor behavior  
4.3. Risk factor analysis 
After finishing the response time and cost analysis in previous part, here is the risk factor analysis 
of the scenario. First of all, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines the IT risk as 
“the net mission impact considering (1) the probability that a particular threat-source will exercise 
(accidentally trigger or intentionally exploit) particular information system vulnerability and (2) the 
resulting impact if this should occur” [26]. This task is proposed in a standard quality cycle based on 
ISO/IEC 27001 standards [27]. This cycle includes four main steps: Plan, Do, Check, and then Act. Next 
part is the risk analysis for this study scenario using the previous cycle: 
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4.3.1. Information Security Risk Management Program (PLAN) 
4.3.1.1. Select the critical areas 
In this part, this research uses list provided by the CSA on the critical areas of focus in cloud 
computing environments [12]. The main critical areas in this study scenario would be: -­‐ Governance and Enterprise Risk Management: 
 This domain is considered one of the most discussed area in cloud computing. Since the cloud 
computing tends to restore more administrative roles and permissions from the cloud customer, the cloud 
providers have the responsibility to govern the cloud services and provide reliable and trustworthy 
services to build the trust relationship between the cloud providers and their customers. Also, the cloud 
providers are accountable to measure various risks introduced by cloud computing and how customer can 
transfer this task to the cloud provider. For this study scenario, this area is very important since this study 
tends to set up the private cloud in external and shared infrastructure i.e. Amazon cloud services. This 
research examines how Amazon govern the cloud and perform risk management tasks and it gathers this 
information from Amazon documents such as Amazon Web Services Risk and compliance document 
[28].                  -­‐ Information Management and Data Security: 
 This area is also an important factor, since this study is using shared resources from a public cloud 
provider such as Amazon. This research aims to ensure that a managing data process is being built in the 
shared infrastructure to protect the data while using the cloud. Even if this study scenario is designed as a 
private cloud, there is no physical control over the data since all the data is transferred to Amazon 
datacenters. This research also aims to ensure that Amazon has designed good security controls to manage 
the data. This process identifies who is accountable of the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the 
data and the VMs. This study measures the risks introduced to the study scenario by including this area. 
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-­‐ Encryption and Key Management: 
 Since the private cloud is placed in Amazon, a remote access is required to access the VMs and 
perform regular tasks. In the risk analysis, the research measures the risks associated with this factor. It 
examines how the connection to the VM is well protected from any adversary. This is based on the 
current encryption and key management controls provided by Amazon.     -­‐ Virtualization: 
 Virtualization is considered one of the most risks associated with cloud computing. Since the first 
time the cloud has been introduced, the virtualization remains the first security issue that introduces 
various risks to cloud provider and customers.  There are different factors that virtualization uses to 
provide cloud services such as multi-tenancy, VM isolation and hypervisor vulnerabilities [12]. Also, this 
study aims to examine how the virtualization risk concerns may affect the VMs in a shared environment.          
4.3.1.2. Strategy and planning 
The ultimate goal of this risk assessment is to define and determine the risks associated with 
cloud computing and how the risk factor can be related to other service level agreement factors such as 
the response time and the service cost. This helps to understand the risks associated with clouds and 
provide information for decision makers to decide wither to move to cloud or not.  This task aims to 
analyze different critical areas in cloud so the cloud customer can ensure and understand the cloud risks 
associated with other SLA factors such as the response time and cost. This also helps the cloud customers 
to understand the surrounding issues with cloud so they can place security controls to resolve these risks 
concerns. The main strategy of this task is to measure the risk associated with the VMs in the cloud. First 
of all, this study calculates the risk associated with one VM. Then, it creates new VM and calculates the 
associated risk with the two VMs until to the last VM is created. In this task, the total number of VMs that 
the study creates is 10 VMs. The scope of this risk analysis is to determine the risks introduced while 
moving to cloud and creating up to 10 VMs.      
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4.3.2. Implementation (Do) 
The implementation part contains the following processes: risk analysis, risk assessment, and risk 
mitigation. Each process of this step is done separately as the following: 
4.3.2.1. Risk analysis 
For this part, this research uses the Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability 
Evaluation (OCTAVE) method as a general guide to perform the task. Since this method is being used in 
large-scale organization processes [29], some parts of this method are ignored in this study. This part 
tends to evaluate and identify the scenario assets, critical threats, and possible vulnerabilities. In addition 
to the OCTAVE method, this research also uses the Cloud Security Alliance guide to complete this task 
[12]. 
Risk analysis task contains the following processes: 
4.3.2.1.1. Assets Identification and Evaluation 
This research uses OCTAVE and Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) guide to identify the main assets 
that are reliable to this study scenario. The first OCTAVE step is to build assets-based threat profiles by 
identifying the important assets. Then, this research evaluates those assets to find the possible value of 
each asset. In term of the study scenario, it identifies the assets that are important to this scenario and to 
the cloud providers. In general, CSA declares that assets in cloud environments fall into two categories: 
data or application, functions, and processes. In the study scenario, information and functions are moved 
to cloud providers. Thus, this research uses the CSA guide to divide the assets to two different categories 
as the following [12]: 
4.3.2.1.1.1. Data 
Data is considered is one of the main assets in cloud environments since in this case, all the data has been 
moved to the cloud and there is no physical governance over the data anymore. This research recognizes 
the data that is resided in the VMs is sensitive data. There are different questions that need to be asked to 
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assess the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the data. NIST defines confidentiality as “the 
security goal that generates the requirement for protection from intentional or accidental attempts to 
perform unauthorized data reads. Confidentiality covers data in storage, during processing, and in transit”, 
integrity as “the security goal that generates the requirement for protection against either intentional or 
accidental attempts to violate data integrity (the property that data has when it has not been altered in an 
unauthorized manner) or system integrity (the quality that a system has when it performs its intended 
function in an unimpaired manner, free from unauthorized manipulation)” and availability as “the security 
goal that generates the requirement for protection against— • Intentional or accidental attempts to (1) 
perform unauthorized deletion of data or (2) otherwise cause a denial of service or data • Unauthorized 
use of system resources” [26]. Next, this research examines each one of these requirements using various 
questions provided by the CSA guide [12]: 
• Confidentiality: 
How would we be harmed if the data became widely public and widely distributed? 
For this study scenario, the data is set to be private and it’s only accessible by authorized user. 
The VMs need credentials to access the data that resides in the cloud since there is no data is set to be 
public. If any data breaches happen or the data has accessed by unintended users, the risk affecting the 
data confidentiality increases dramatically. This would cause real harm to the data.         
How would we be harmed if an employee of the cloud provider accessed the data? 
As the data is set to be private, this research needs to ensure that no one can access the data 
including the cloud provider unless the provider gets the permission. Thus, if the cloud provider accesses 
the data without permission, this would cause harmful risk to the data privacy. Also, this research needs 
to ensure the provider placed security controls to protect the data privacy.     
• Integrity: 
How would we be harmed if the information/data were unexpectedly changed? 
The accuracy of the data should be assured to protect the authenticity of the data.  Unexpected 
change may introduce risk if there is no backup process in place.  Any unintended change to the data can 
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affect the data integrity and introduce more risks to the cloud. Indeed, this would harm the trust 
relationship between the cloud provider and the customer.     
• Availability: 
How would we be harmed if the data were unavailable for a period of time? 
The data should be available as needed at any time. Any unavailability issue may cause negative 
impact on the data and the scenario. This research should ensure how Amazons manages the data 
availability and how the remote connection can affect the data availability.    
4.3.2.1.1.2. Application, functions, and processes (virtual resources) 
In this category, this research states that the vertical machines (VMs) in this scenario are the main assets 
for this study. Thus, this research assesses the security requirements against this asset as the following: 
• Confidentiality: 
How would we be harmed if the VMs became widely public and widely distributed? 
For this scenario, this research sets up the VMs in a virtual private cloud in Amazon AWS. The 
VMs should be accessible by the authorized user only. If the VMs appear in the amazon public cloud, a 
risk is introduced and it may affect the VMs confidentiality.   
How would we be harmed if an employee of the cloud provider accessed the VMs? 
The VMs should be accessible by the authorized user only.  Any unauthorized access to the VMs 
can cause harmful impact to the VMs confidentiality.  This research needs to ensure that Amazon places 
good access controls that protect the VMs access.    
• Integrity: 
How would we be harmed if an outsider manipulated a process or a function in the VMs? 
Authorized user is the only one who can manipulate any process in the VMs. Any unauthorized 
attempt to create, alter, or delete any process in the VMs would harm the VMs integrity. This research 
should ensure that the only ones who can control the VMs’ processes, functions, and resources are the 
authorized people. 
	   25	  
• Availability: 
How would we be harmed if the VMs were unavailable for a period of time? 
All VMs should be up available to us as needed. Any down time to the VMs may introduce high 
risks and affect the availability requirement.  Thus, this research should ensure that Amazon could meet 
the uptime requirements stated in its SLA. All cloud resources that provide access function to the VMs 
should available all the time. These resources include internal networks, and virtual private cloud 
resources such as IPs, security groups, and subnets.  
From the asset identification and evaluation task, this study concludes that the main assets that are 
very important in this study’s scenario are the data and the VMs.  Thus, this study uses a cloud 
deployment model that suits and meets this study’s security requirements. This chosen model is the 
external private cloud in a shared infrastructure i.e. Amazon cloud services. Table 6 shows the assets 
classification and their impacts when a violation happens: 
Assets Data classification Impact classification 
Amazon EC2 Instances 
(VMs) 
Private High 
Data resides in each VM Private Medium  
Table 6:  Assets classification 
4.3.2.1.2. Threat Identification 
NIST defines a threat as “the potential for a threat-source to exercise (accidentally trigger or 
intentionally exploit) a specific vulnerability” [26]. Additionally, NIST states that a threat source “either 
(1) intent and method targeted at the intentional exploitation of a vulnerability or (2) a situation and 
method that may accidentally trigger a vulnerability” [26]. In this part, the research uses different sources 
that help us to provide combined list of different threats that are related to the study’s scenario. CSA 
provide a list of the top threats to cloud computing [30]. Also, Whitman provides a general list of threats 
to information security [31]. Table 7 contains different threats attached with the possible threat source and 
the motivation.  
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Some cloud-specific threats provided by the Cloud Security Alliance [30] 
Threat Malicious Insiders 
Threat source • Inside adversaries. 
• Cloud provider employees. 
• Attackers 
Motivation • Data disclosure or destruction  
• Unauthorized data manipulation. 
• Money gain. 
Critical Area • Governance and Enterprise Risk Management 
  
Threat Shared Technology Issues 
Threat source • Attackers 
• Cloud customers 
• Lack of patching support from cloud provider. 
Motivation • Impact on other cloud customers’ operation 
• Unauthorized activity. 
• Denial of service.  
• Unauthorized access. 
Critical Area • Virtualization 
 
Threat Data Loss or Leakage 
Threat source • Attackers. 
• Insiders. 
	   27	  
• Untrained cloud customers. 
• Weak encryption and key management by cloud provider. 
Motivation • Data disclosure. 
• Data manipulation or deletion. 
•  Money gain. 
•  Challenge 
Critical Area • Encryption and Key Management 
• Information Management and Data Security 
 
Threat Account or Service Hijacking 
Threat source • Attackers. 
• Weak authentication controls. 
• Weak monitoring techniques.  
• Lack of understanding the cloud provider policies.   
Motivation • Leverage the reputation of the cloud customer. 
• Use the attacked services to launch new attacks.  
• Compromise the availability of the service. 
• Compromise the integrity of the account.     
Critical Area • Governance and Enterprise Risk Management 
 
Threat Unknown Risk Profile 
Threat source • Cloud provider governance 
• Using unsecure systems, codes, software, or hardware. 
• Compliance issues in the internal security controls. 
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Motivation • Exploit unknown vulnerabilities. 
• Launch unauthorized activity. 
• Impersonate cloud customers to gain trust from cloud 
provider.  
Critical Area • Governance and Enterprise Risk Management 
Some general threats to information security [31] 
Threat Deliberate Software Attacks 
Threat source • Viruses, worms, or malwares. 
• Vulnerable software, code, or system. 
• Weak patching management. 
Motivation • Exploit known vulnerabilities. 
• Denial of service 
• Leverage the reputation of the cloud customers. 
• Launch new attacks using gain services. 
Critical Area • Governance and Enterprise Risk Management 
• Virtualization 
 
Threat Act of Human Error or Failure 
Threat source • Cloud customers 
• Insiders 
Motivation • There is no motivation since the employee does unintentional 
error.   
Critical Area Governance and Enterprise Risk Management 
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Threat QoS Deviations from Service Providers 
Threat source • Cloud/service provider 
Motivation • There is no motivation since the employee should try to 
provide high quality service.  
Critical Area Governance and Enterprise Risk Management 
Table 7: Cloud-Specific Threats 
4.3.2.1.3. Vulnerability Identification 
NIST defines the vulnerability as “A flaw or weakness in system security procedures, design, 
implementation, or internal controls that could be exercised (accidentally triggered or intentionally 
exploited) and result in a security breach or a violation of the system’s security policy” [26]. This part is 
very essential in risk assessment to identify the known vulnerabilities to protect the data and VMs from 
attacks caused by known vulnerabilities. Grobauer defines the vulnerability as “the probability that an 
asset will be unable to resist the action of a threat agent” [32]. In this task, this research determines and 
identifies cloud-specific vulnerabilities that could affect any cloud environment. Grobauer provides a list 
of cloud-specific vulnerabilities that this study uses in the analysis [32]. Bamiah and Brohi also provide a 
list of cloud-specific vulnerabilities that is used in the analysis too [33]. 
Cloud-specific vulnerabilities by Grobayer [32]  
Vulnerability Vulnerable VM images provided by the cloud provider 
Threat source Cloud/service providers 
Threat action The cloud customer launches new VM using a pre-defined 
vulnerable VM image. 
Critical area  Governance and Enterprise Risk Management 
 
Vulnerability Collect detailed information about configuration, patch 
management, and code.   
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Threat source Attackers 
Threat action The attacker rents a VM and uses its administrative features 
to collect important information such as cloud infrastructure, 
patch management, and API code.   
Critical area • Information Management and Data Security 
• Governance and Enterprise Risk Management 
 
Vulnerability Vulnerable VM images distributed in a virtual images store  
Threat source Cloud customer 
Threat action The cloud customer uses untrusted and vulnerable VM 
image that is available in VM images store.  
Critical area Governance and Enterprise Risk Management 
 
Vulnerability Data leakage while cloning the VM 
Threat source Cloud provider 
Threat action When a provider clones a VM, data leakage happens during 
the cloning since this process copies data and private key for 
a host. Then, all the data in this VM go public when a VM 
launches using the cloned image.  
Critical area Information Management and Data Security 
 
Vulnerability Weak random key generation and weak key management.  
Threat source Cloud provider 
Threat action Virtualization may introduce a problem between the 
hardware and OS kernel, which leads to weak random key 
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generation  
Critical area • Encryption and Key Management 
• Virtualization 
 
Vulnerability Data recovery vulnerability  
Threat source Cloud provider  
Threat action This happens when a provider faces a problem in backing up 
the VMs and this leads to VM loss. 
Critical area Information Management and Data Security 
 
Vulnerability Data destruction policies 
Threat source Cloud provider 
Threat action When a customer does not need the cloud service anymore, 
the provider should remove all his data from the virtual 
storage only. The provider can’t wipe the physical disk if it 
is still used by other shared users.  
Critical area • Governance and Enterprise Risk Management 
• Information Management and Data Security 
Cloud-specific vulnerabilities by Bamiah and Brohi [33] 
Vulnerability Virtual Machine Escape 
Threat source Attacker 
Threat action There is more risk when the VM OS is same as cloud host 
OS since they might share the same vulnerability.  Also, co-
location of VMs in a shared host increases the attack 
surface. Finally, the attacker can use his VM to attack and 
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compromise the host.   
Critical area Governance and Enterprise Risk Management 
 
Vulnerability Insecure Cryptography 
Threat source • Cloud provider 
• Attacker 
Threat action When cloud provider uses the virtualization to partition a 
physical server to multiple VMs, this server may generate 
weak random key due to the lack of sufficient entropy pool. 
Thus, creating truly random key in cloud environment is 
much harder than a detected PC desktop. This may allow the 
attacker to decode cryptographic text easily.  
Critical area • Encryption and Key Management 
• Information Management and Data Security 
• Virtualization 
 
Vulnerability Internet Dependency 
Threat source Cloud provider 
Threat action Most of the cloud services depend totally on the Internet so 
the user can reach and utilize those services. Any Internet 
issue increases the risk of service availability since the 
service is useless if it’s unavailable.   
Critical area Governance and Enterprise Risk Management 
Table 8: Cloud-Specific Vulnerabilities 
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4.3.2.2. Risk assessment 
NIST states that risk assessment is “the process of identifying the risks to system security and 
determining the probability of occurrence, the resulting impact, and additional safeguards that would 
mitigate this impact” [26]. According to this framework [8], this part is divided into three different steps: 
4.3.2.2.1. Likelihood Determination (L) 
NIST states that the likelihood determination aims “to derive an overall likelihood rating that 
indicates the probability that a potential vulnerability may be exercised within the construct of the 
associated threat environment” [26]. This step tends to estimate the likelihood of a vulnerability to be 
exploited or occurred. This part also uses the results from the vulnerability identification step in section 
4.3.2.1.3. The vulnerability is evaluated and assigned a numeric value and likelihood level. The numeric 
value ranges from 0.1 to 1.0. A value of 0.1 means the probability of a vulnerability being exploited is 
very low while a value of 1.0 means the probability of a vulnerability being exploited is very high. The 
vulnerability likelihood levels are high, medium, and low.  Similarly, high level means the threat source 
has high motivations or capabilities to exploit certain vulnerability while low level indicates the lack of 
required skills and incentives to exploit given vulnerability. The following table identifies each 
vulnerability and its likelihood level and rate.     
Likelihood Estimation 
Vulnerability Affected 
Assets 
Likelihood 
Level 
Likelihood 
rate 
Vulnerable VM images provided by 
the cloud provider. 
Amazon 
VMs 
Medium 0.5 
Collecting detailed information about 
configuration, patch management, 
and code.   
Amazon 
VMs 
High 1.0 
Vulnerable VM images distributed in Amazon Medium 0.5 
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a virtual images store VMs 
Data leakage while cloning the VM Data Medium 0.5 
Data destruction policies Data High 1.0 
Data recovery vulnerability  Data Low 0.1 
Weak random key generation and 
weak key management.  
Amazon 
VMs 
Data 
Medium 0.5 
Virtual machine escape Amazon 
VMs 
Low 0.1 
Insecure cryptography Data Low 0.1 
Internet dependency Amazon 
VMs 
Low 0.2 
Table 9: Likelihood identification  
Next, this research needs to identify the likelihood of exploiting vulnerabilities on certain cloud 
assets. This research uses the next formula to achieve this goal:   
Likelihood of exploiting vulnerabilities on assets= total likelihood rate of an asset / the 
number of caused vulnerabilities 
Likelihood of exploiting vulnerabilities on (Amazon EC2 VMs) =  
(0.5 + 1.0 + 0.5 + 0.5 + 0.1 + 0.1) / 6 = 2.7 / 6 = 0.45 
Likelihood of exploiting vulnerabilities on (data) =  
(0.5 + 1.0 + 0.1 + 0.5 + 0.2) / 5 = 2.3 / 5 = 0.46      
4.3.2.2.2. Impact analysis (I) 
NIST states that impact analysis task aims “to determine the adverse impact resulting from a 
successful threat exercise of vulnerability” [26]. In this step, this study assesses the loss impact of each 
asset based on its value. The impact level is divided into three levels: high, medium, and low where high 
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level represents high value asset that may cause high impact to the study’s scenario while low impact 
level states the least value assets in the scenario. Each asset is given impact rete that ranges from 1 to 100:     
Impact Estimation 
Threat Affected 
Assets  
Impact 
Level 
Impact 
rate 
Malicious Insiders Amazon VMs High 100 
Shared Technology Issues Amazon VMs 
and data 
High 90 
Data Loss or Leakage Data Medium  60 
Account or Service Hijacking Amazon VMs, 
data 
High 80 
Deliberate Software Attacks Amazon VMs High 80 
 Act of Human Error or Failure Amazon VMs Low 20 
QoS Deviations from Service Providers Amazon VMs, 
data 
Medium 50 
Unknown Risk Profile Amazon VMs, 
data 
High 90 
Table 10: Impact estimation  
 
From Table 10, this research estimates the asset value based on how a threat impacts given assets. 
Then, it calculates the total value of each asset and finds the average as the following: 
Impact value of an asset= total impact rate of an asset / the number of caused threats 
Impact value of an Amazon EC2 VM = 
 (100 + 90 + 80 + 80 + 20 + 50 + 90) / 7 = 510 / 7 = 72.8 
Impact value of data asset = (90 + 60 + 80 + 50 + 90) / 5 = 370 / 5 = 74 
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4.3.2.2.3. Risk Determination (R) 
After this study determines vulnerabilities likelihoods, and the threats impacts, it uses the outputs to 
evaluate and determine the risk level of each asset. NIST declares, “The purpose of this step is to assess 
the level of risk to the IT system” [26]. To calculate the risk factor, this research uses the following 
formula: 
Risk (R) = (Likelihood (L) x Impact (I)) - (percentage of risk mitigated by current controls of given 
Vulnerability (%CC) x Likelihood (L) x Impact (I)) + (Uncertainty of given Vulnerability (U) x 
Likelihood (L) x Impact (I)) 
This formula is adapted from this original formula [34]: 
Risk = Likelihood of vulnerability x impact – percentage risk already controlled + element of 
uncertainly 
This formula has four variables: 
Likelihood (L):  
Likelihood of exploiting vulnerabilities on (Amazon EC2 VMs) = 0.45 
Likelihood of exploiting vulnerabilities on (data) = 0.44 
Impact (I): 
Impact value of an Amazon EC2 VM= 72.8 
Impact value of data asset = 74 
Percentage of risk mitigated by current controls (CC): 
This variable states the current controls that are placed to mitigate risks that impact the assets. In this 
study’s scenario, this research estimates the value based on what Amazon has developed to protect the 
cloud assets.  
Uncertainty (U): 
Since it is not possible in risk management to know exactly everything about vulnerabilities, threats, and 
attacks or how the current controls are placed to reduce or mitigate the risks, the uncertainty variable is 
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used to substitute the unknown errors in the estimations. If the data is 80% accurate, the uncertainty factor 
is 100 – 80 = 20%.  
Next are calculation tables of risk factor for the vulnerabilities:  
Vulnerability #1: Vulnerable VM images provided by the cloud provider. 
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VMs 1 72.8 0.5 5% 98%  (72.8 x 0.5)  
– ((72.8 x 0.5) x 0.98) 
+ ((72.8 x 0.5) x 
0.05) 
= 2.548/100  
= 0.02548  
R= 1-(1-R1)= 1-(1- 0.02548) 
= 0.02548 
VMs 2 72.8 0.5 5% 98% 0.02548  R=1-(1-R1)(1-R2) 
= 1-(1-0.02548)(1-0.02548) 
= 0.0503107696 
VMs 3 72.8 0.5 5% 98% 0.02548  0.07450885119 
VMs 4 72.8 0.5 5% 98% 0.02548  0.09809036566 
VMs 5 72.8 0.5 5% 98% 0.02548  0.12107102314 
VMs 6 72.8 0.5 5% 98% 0.02548  0.14346613347 
VMs 7 72.8 0.5 5% 98% 0.02548  0.16529061639 
VMs 8 72.8 0.5 5% 98% 0.02548  0.18655901148 
VMs 9 72.8 0.5 5% 98% 0.02548  0.20728548787 
VMs 10 72.8 0.5 5% 98% 0.02548  0.22748385364 
Table 11: Risk factor for vulnerability#1 
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To estimate the current controls in Table 11, this study searched for different issues that have 
happened in Amazon AWS. These issues are related to pre-define images that Amazon provides in its 
store and the community store. For instance, Amazon reported that certain Linux images have a common 
vulnerability [35]. Also, Amazon reported that certain public EC2 AMIs have Linux 2.6 kernel 
vulnerability [35]. Eric Hammond states in Amazon forums that Amazon has weakness in generating SSH 
host key where the old AMIs bundle the same SSH host key [36]. This means that each instance launches 
from that public AMI will the same SSH host key and anyone can access any instance used that public 
AMI. Then, Amazon solved this issue and forced that the public AMI should generate unique SSH host 
key for each new launched instance [37]. All these issues indicate that there are always some issues with 
the public AMIs provided by Amazon. Some of them have been resolved while there might be some 
hidden issues. From the provided resources, Amazon provided better controls whenever a Linux issue 
appeared while leaving most of the windows issues to the Microsoft updates. All current controls 
percentages and uncertainty factors would reflect those issues.  
It is appeared that the vulnerable images are considered as possible of risk. Figure 10 shows the 
risk factor for this vulnerability goes up gradually while increasing the number of used VMs. Thus, 
adding more VMs can increase the risk of this vulnerability by using vulnerable images.   
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Figure 10: Risk factor for vulnerability#1 	  
Vulnerability #2: Collecting detailed information about configuration, patch management, and code.  
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VMs 1 72.8 1.0 3% 85%  (72.8 x 1.0)  
–  ((72.8 x 1.0) x 0.85) 
+ ((72.8 x 1.0) x 0.03) 
=  13.104/100 
= 0.13104 
1-(1- 0.13104) 
= 0.13104 
VMs 2 72.8 1.0 3% 85% 0.13104 0.2449085184 
VMs 3 72.8 1.0 3% 85% 0.13104 0.34385570614 
VMs 4 72.8 1.0 3% 85% 0.13104 0.42983685441 
VMs 5 72.8 1.0 3% 85% 0.13104 0.50455103301 
VMs 6 72.8 1.0 3% 85% 0.13104 0.56947466564 
VMs 7 72.8 1.0 3% 85% 0.13104 0.62589070546 
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For vulnerability #2 in Table 12, any attacker has various opportunities to collect as much 
information as he/she can about the Amazon AWS. Amazon provides very detailed documents about how 
to use and manage all its cloud services and APIs. The attacker can use those documents to understand 
how Amazon services works. Also, the attacker can register and use the services as regular user, then, he 
can get insight view how an instance is being configured and what the default settings and minimum-
security controls are. All these rich information can help the attacker to find good strategies to attack any 
service hosted by Amazon services. Thus, it is clear that an attacker can easily use this vulnerability, 
which leads to 3% of uncertainty. 
Collecting information about the cloud infrastructure can be an easy task for an attacker due to 
the many options that he/she can use to complete the task. In the analysis, Figure 11 demonstrates that 
risk factor of collection information from cloud environments keeps growing steadily while adding the 
VMs one after the other. For this vulnerability, the risk factor ranges from 0.13104 for one VM to 
0.75453 for 10 VMs.  
 
 
VMs 8 72.8 1.0 3% 85% 0.13104 0.67491398741 
VMs 9 72.8 1.0 3% 85% 0.13104 0.7175132585 
VMs 10 72.8 1.0 3% 85% 0.13104 0.75453032111 
Table 12: Risk factor for vulnerability#2 
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Figure 11: Risk factor for vulnerability#2 	  
Vulnerability #3: Vulnerable VM images distributed in a virtual images store. 
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VMs 1 72.8 0.5 5% 95% 3.64/100 
= 0.0364 
1-(1 – 0.0364) 
=0.0364 
VMs 2 72.8 0.5 20% 80% 0.0364 0.07147504 
VMs 3 72.8 0.5 20% 80% 0.0364 0.10527334854 
VMs 4 72.8 0.5 30% 60% 0.0364 0.13784139865 
VMs 5 72.8 0.5 20% 80% 0.0364 0.169223972 
VMs 6 72.8 0.5 30% 60% 0.0364 0.199464219 
VMs 7 72.8 0.5 20% 80% 0.0364 0.228603722 
VMs 8 72.8 0.5 30% 60% 0.0364 0.256682546 
VMs 9 72.8 0.5 30% 60% 0.0364 0.283739301 
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In Table 13, this vulnerability is almost the same as vulnerability #1 since Amazon provides 
community store for public AMIs where any user can bundle a given instance and build an AMI. Then, 
the user can place this AMI in the community AMIs store so any user can use that AMI. It is clear that 
there is a chance that one of the published AMI might be vulnerable. Thus, in Table 13, the same 
estimations in Table 11 are used. 
Using VM images from public or community store introduce more risk to the cloud 
environments. Similar to Figure 10, Figure 12 depicts that the risk factor of this vulnerability increasingly 
accumulates from a factor of 0.0364 per one VM to a total of 0.3098 for all the VMs.  
 
 
Figure 12: Risk factor for vulnerability #3 
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VMs 10 72.8 0.5 30% 60% 0.0364 0.309811191 
Table 13: Risk factor for vulnerability #3 
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Vulnerability #4: Data leakage while cloning the VM 
 
In Vulnerability #1, this study states that Amazon had an issue while cloning an instance to build 
an AMI. The private SSH host key would be leaked and copied to the new AMI, which leads to enormous 
privacy issues [36]. After Amazon solved this issue, this study could estimate that Amazon provided 
better controls for the cloning process as appeared in Table 14.   
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Data 1 74 0.5 10% 97% (74 x 0.5)  
–  ((74 x 0.5) x 0.97) 
+ ((74 x 0.5) x 0.1) 
= 4.81/100 
=0.0481 
1-(1-0.0481) 
= 0.0481 
Data 2 74 0.5 10% 97% 0.0481 0.09388639 
Data 3 74 0.5 10% 97% 0.0481 0.137470455 
Data 4 74 0.5 10% 97% 0.0481 0.178958126 
Data 5 74 0.5 10% 97% 0.0481 0.21845024 
Data 6 74 0.5 10% 97% 0.0481 0.256042783 
Data 7 74 0.5 10% 97% 0.0481 0.291827126 
Data 8 74 0.5 10% 97% 0.0481 0.325890241 
Data 9 74 0.5 10% 97% 0.0481 0.35831492 
Data 10 74 0.5 10% 97% 0.0481 0.389179973 
Table 14: Risk factor for vulnerability #4 
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Data leakage is one of the issues that forces decision makers to not move to cloud. Cloning 
process one of the main features of the cloud environments, which help to backup exiting environment or 
provides an elastic environment. As a result of the analysis, Figure 13 shows that risk factor of data 
leakage in cloning process goes up gradually as the number of the number of VMs increases. The risk 
factor increases from a value of 0.0481 to a total of 0.3891. 
 
Figure 13: Risk factor for vulnerability #4 
Vulnerability #5: Data destruction policies 
0	  0.05	  
0.1	  0.15	  
0.2	  0.25	  
0.3	  0.35	  
0.4	  0.45	  
1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	   8	   9	   10	  
Ri
sk
	  fa
ct
or
	  
Number	  of	  VMs	  
Risk	  Factor	  for	  Vulnerability	  #4	  
 
Asset 
 
 
# 
VM 
Im
pa
ct
 (I
) 
L
ik
el
ih
oo
d 
ra
te
 
(L
) 
U
nc
er
ta
in
ty
 %
 
C
ur
re
nt
 
C
on
tr
ol
s %
  
 !"#$  !"#$%&!!  %   !"#$  !"#$%&!!  % 
Data 1 74 1.0 15% 90% (74 x 1.0)  
–  ((74 x 1.0) x 0.90) 
+ ((74 x 1.0) x 0.15) 
= 18.5/100 
= 0.1850 
0.1850 
Data 2 74 1.0 15% 90% 0.1850 0.335775 
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Amazon does not state clearly its procedures for data destruction in Amazon EC2 instances. 
Amazon states that users who require data to be wiped have the responsibility to use special method to 
wipe Amazon Elastic Block Storage (EBS) devices [38]. The EBS devices are the only storage devices 
that can be wiped by the customer. In Amazon S3, for instance, if a customer wants to delete data, 
Amazon just removes the mapping between the customer and data object. Amazon does not declare how 
it deletes and wipes customer data from the shared storage. This leads to a chance where the data can be 
restored from the physical storage. On the other hand, Amazon states that if a storage device is not used 
anymore, Amazon has a decommissioning process to destroy the data and this process may include 
physical destruction for the storage device if needed [38]. In Table 15, the uncertainly and current 
controls are estimated based on what information in Amazon security reports [38] [28]. 
Data destruction in cloud environments is ambiguous process since the data is stored in shared 
storage. Thus, the physical storage devices cannot be wiped completely. As a result, the analysis results in 
Figure 14 indicate the risk factor of data destruction increases significantly when the test cloud uses more 
VMs since adding more VMs results in more data that need to be destroyed at some point. The risk factor 
rises from 0.1850 of one VM to 0.8707 of 10 VMs.      
Data 3 74 1.0 15% 90% 0.1850 0.458656625 
Data 4 74 1.0 15% 90% 0.1850 0.558805149 
Data 5 74 1.0 15% 90% 0.1850 0.640426197 
Data 6 74 1.0 15% 90% 0.1850 0.70694735 
Data 7 74 1.0 15% 90% 0.1850 0.761162091 
Data 8 74 1.0 15% 90% 0.1850 0.805347104 
Data 9 74 1.0 15% 90% 0.1850 0.84135789 
Data 10 74 1.0 15% 90% 0.1850 0.87070668 
Table 15: Risk factor for vulnerability #5 
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Figure 14: Risk factor for vulnerability #5 	  
Vulnerability #6: Data recovery vulnerability 
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Data 1 74 0.1 10% 95% (74 x 0.1)  
–  ((74 x 0.1) x 0.95) 
+ ((74 x 0.1) x 0.1) 
= 1.11/100 
=0.111 
0.111 
Data 2 74 0.1 10% 95% 0.111 0.209679 
Data 3 74 0.1 10% 95% 0.111 0.297404631 
Data 4 74 0.1 10% 95% 0.111 0.375392717 
Data 5 74 0.1 10% 95% 0.111 0.444724125 
Data 6 74 0.1 10% 95% 0.111 0.506359747 
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For data recovery, Amazon states that it stores all the data of the Amazon services in multiple 
locations to provide a better backup process [38]. Amazon stores the data in multiple availability zones in 
different physical locations while it stores redundant backups for the Amazon EBS in the same 
availability zone. Also, Amazon dose not backup any virtual disk attached to a running instance. 
Nevertheless, Amazon experienced severe crash that affects its EC2 cloud services and lead to 
permanently data loss [39]. It is appeared that some data of many customers have lost and cannot be 
recovered even though Amazon claims it has good recovery process that has been tested extensively. In 
Table 16, the values are estimated based on what Amazon claims and what issues have occurred in the 
Amazon services so far. 
Figure 15 demonstrates the importance of data recovery risk on data security. It is clear from the 
chart that the risk factor of the data recovery keeps increasing while the number of the VMs increases. 
This shows that adding more VMs results in higher data recovery risk. The risk factor has increased from 
a value of 0.111 to a total of 0.6916. 
Data 7 74 0.1 10% 95% 0.111 0.561153815 
Data 8 74 0.1 10% 95% 0.111 0.609865742 
Data 9 74 0.1 10% 95% 0.111 0.653170645 
Data 10 74 0.1 10% 95% 0.111 0.691668703 
Table 16: Risk factor for vulnerability #6 
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Figure 15: Risk factor for vulnerability #6      
Vulnerability #7: Weak random key generation and weak key management. 
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–  ((73.4 x 0.5) x 0.95) 
+ ((73.4 x 0.5) x 0.3) 
= 12.845/100 
0.12845 
0.12845 
VMs 
Data 
2 73.4 0.5 30% 95% 0.12845 
0.240400598 
VMs 
Data 
3 73.4 0.5 30% 95% 0.12845 
0.337971141 
VMs 4 73.4 0.5 30% 95% 0.12845 0.423008748 
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Amazon uses different security credentials that allow customer to interact with the cloud services 
such as AWS access key, X.509 certificate, web-based app password, and virtual or hardware multi factor 
authentication (MFA) [38]. No serious issues have been reported about Amazon key management 
processes except security issues related with certain remote-based connection software such as Microsoft 
remote desktop [40]. In Table 17, the values are estimated based on current information provided by 
Amazon. 
The process of generating managing the encryption keys is very critical in cloud environments. 
No reports have been issued concerning any issue with the amazon key generation and management, 
which reflects the estimations.  Nevertheless, Figure 16 depicts the steady increase in the risk factor from 
0.1284 for one VM to a total of 0.7471 for 10 VMs. This increase is justified when there is key 
management issue while adding more VMs. Thus, each VM is vulnerable to this vulnerability.   
Data 
VMs 
Data 
5 73.4 0.5 30% 95% 0.12845 
0.497123274 
VMs 
Data 
6 73.4 0.5 30% 95% 0.12845 
0.56171779 
VMs 
Data 
7 73.4 0.5 30% 95% 0.12845 
0.618015139 
VMs 
Data 
8 73.4 0.5 30% 95% 0.12845 
0.667081095 
VMs 
Data 
9 73.4 0.5 30% 95% 0.12845 
0.709844528 
VMs 
Data 
10 73.4 0.5 30% 95% 0.12845 
0.747114999 
Table 17: Risk factor for vulnerability #7 
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Figure 16: Risk factor for vulnerability #7 
Vulnerability #8: Virtual machine escape 
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VMs 1 72.8 0.1 10% 95%  (72.8 x 1.0)  
–  ((72.8 x 1.0) x 0.95) 
+ ((72.8 x 1.0) x 0.1) 
= 10.92/100 
= 0.1092 
0.1092 
VMs 2 72.8 0.1 10% 95% 0.1092 0.20647536 
VMs 3 72.8 0.1 10% 95% 0.1092 0.293128251 
VMs 4 72.8 0.1 10% 95% 0.1092 0.370318646 
VMs 5 72.8 0.1 10% 95% 0.1092 0.43907985 
VMs 6 72.8 0.1 10% 95% 0.1092 0.50033233 
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This vulnerability is most of time found in a hypervisor, which allows the attacker to access, all 
resources managed by the hypervisor. These resources include the VMs, shared network resources, and 
shared storage resources. Up to now, Amazon has announced no hypervisor vulnerability. Although, 
Amazon announced some security advisories related to vulnerabilities found in Xen [41] [42]. In both 
announcements, Amazon states that all issues have not affected AWS customers. In Table 18, the values 
are estimated based on amazon announcement and the chance of hypervisor vulnerabilities.   
Figure 17 illustrates that the risk factor of the VM escape escalates gradually as while adding 
more VMs to the cloud environment. If this vulnerability occurs, it affects the available VMs so adding 
VMs leads to higher risk of this vulnerability. The risk factor increases from a value of 0.1092 to a total 
of 0.6853 for all the VMs.      
 
Figure 17: Risk factor for vulnerability #8 
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VMs 7 72.8 0.1 10% 95% 0.1092 0.55489604 
VMs 8 72.8 0.1 10% 95% 0.1092 0.603501392 
VMs 9 72.8 0.1 10% 95% 0.1092 0.64679904 
VMs 10 72.8 0.1 10% 95% 0.1092 0.685368585 
Table 18: Risk factor for vulnerability #8 
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Vulnerability #9: Insecure cryptography 
 
In general, Amazon provides good security controls that allow customers to encrypt their 
information at rest. Amazon states that data storage such as Amazon S3 is only accessible through SSL 
endpoints, which protect data while in transition [38]. On the other hand, the data at rest is by default 
unencrypted and the customers has the option to encrypt the data using some method provided by 
Amazon such as Server Side Encryption (SSE) [43]. 
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Data 1 74 0.1 5% 95% (74 x 0.1)  
–  ((74 x 0.1) x 0.95) 
+ ((74 x 0.1) x 0.05) 
= 0.74/100 
=0.0074 
0.0074 
Data 2 74 0.1 5% 95% 0.0074 0.01474524 
Data 3 74 0.1 5% 95% 0.0074 0.022036125 
Data 4 74 0.1 5% 95% 0.0074 0.029273058 
Data 5 74 0.1 5% 95% 0.0074 0.036456437 
Data 6 74 0.1 5% 95% 0.0074 0.04358666 
Data 7 74 0.1 5% 95% 0.0074 0.050664118 
Data 8 74 0.1 5% 95% 0.0074 0.057689204 
Data 9 74 0.1 5% 95% 0.0074 0.064662304 
Data 10 74 0.1 5% 95% 0.0074 0.071583803 
Table 19: Risk factor for vulnerability #9 
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Insecure cryptography can be serious issue in any environment. In cloud environments, the 
vulnerability may have enormous impact on the cloud resources and it may result in many privacy and 
security issues. Thus, Figure 18 expresses the important behavior of the risk factor of this vulnerability. 
The risk factor increases substantially while using more cloud resources. Consequently, this vulnerability 
introduces a higher risk on the cloud environments. Its risk factor ranges from a value of 0.0074 for one 
VM to a total of 0.0715 for 10 VMs. 
 
Figure 18: Risk factor for vulnerability #9 
Vulnerability #10: Internet dependency 
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Amazon AWS customers relay completely on the Internet to use and interact with the Amazon 
cloud services. Any network disruptions severely affect the availability of the cloud resources. Amazon 
has faced different outages through the past years. In June 2012, an Amazon suffered an outage that 
impacted many businesses and large-scale companies that extremely relay on Amazon services such as 
Netflix, and Instagram and this outage was caused by a natural disaster [44]. Also, in Jun 2012, Amazon 
suffered another outage that affected many businesses such Pinterest and Dropbox [45]. In addition, many 
Amazon outages reported in news [46] [47]. Amazon states that all its data centers are online and no 
datacenter is set as a cold data center to ensure high availability and business continuity management 
[38]. Furthermore, Amazon claims that its systems are designed to tolerate any system or hardware 
failures with less impact. It provides automated processes to move traffic from any area that has a failure. 
Also, Amazon claims that it has good incident response and business continuity plans to be used 
whenever an incident happens. In its SLA, Amazon states that the annual uptime percentage is at least 
=0.024752 
VMs 2 72.8 0.2 10% 93% 0.024752 0.048891338 
VMs 3 72.8 0.2 10% 93% 0.024752 0.07243318 
VMs 4 72.8 0.2 10% 93% 0.024752 0.095392314 
VMs 5 72.8 0.2 10% 93% 0.024752 0.117783163 
VMs 6 72.8 0.2 10% 93% 0.024752 0.139619795 
VMs 7 72.8 0.2 10% 93% 0.024752 0.160915925 
VMs 8 72.8 0.2 10% 93% 0.024752 0.181684934 
VMs 9 72.8 0.1 10% 93% 0.024752 0.201939869 
VMs 10 72.8 0.1 10% 93% 0.024752 0.221693453 
Table 20: Risk factor for vulnerability #10 
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99.95% per year [48]. In Table 20, the factors values are estimated based on the services outages and the 
current controls placed by Amazon.  
Most of the cloud environments depend on the Internet to reach the cloud resources. If there is 
any connection disruption, this causes to an availability issue. This leads to massive impact on the cloud 
environments since all the cloud resources are useless at this point. Figure 19 represents this issue and 
how the risk factor rises while having more cloud resources. The increase risk of unavailability in cloud 
environments depend on the number of cloud resources. The risk factor increases from 0.02475 to 
0.22169 for all VMs. 
 
Figure 19: Risk factor for vulnerability #10 
Figure 20 illustrates the overall behavior of the risk factor for all vulnerabilities while 
adding more VMs to the cloud environment. In general, the risk factor increases in all cases but 
the increase rate depends on the vulnerabilities. It is clear from the chart the increase rate for 
vulnerability #5 “Data destruction policies” is the highest while the rates of vulnerabilities #6 
“Data recovery” and #9 “Insecure cryptography” are lowest rates in the study’s scenario. The 
other vulnerabilities have the average rates of increases that are not considered as sharp 
escalation. 
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Figure 20: Risk factor Vs. Number of VMs 
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V1	  V2	  V3	  V4	  V5	  V6	  V7	  V8	  V9	  V10	  
# Vulnerability 
 
Risk Factor 
1 0.150412217 
2 0.568913115 
3 0.207832352 
4 0.265105099 
5 0.695536388 
6 0.509531338 
7 0.561661049 
8 0.503814898 
9 0.046195712 
10 0.14644147 
Table 21: Risk factor per vulnerability 
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 After this thesis states the general behavior of the risk factor, it calculates the average of the risk 
factor for every vulnerability. Table 21 shows the resulted outputs of the average of the risk factor for 
every vulnerability. 
 Figure 21 depicts the average of the risk factor based on the vulnerabilities. It is clear from the chart 
that vulnerability #5 “Data destruction policies” has the highest average risk factor at value of 0.69553. 
Vulnerabilities #1 “Data recovery”, #9 “Insecure cryptography” and #10 “Internet dependency” have the 
lowest averages that range from 0.046 to 0.150. The averages of other vulnerabilities fluctuate between 
0.20 and 0.56. 
 
Figure 21: Risk factor per vulnerability  	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1 0.577039428 
2 0.821104355 
3 0.924334195 
4 0.967996348 
5 0.986463717 
	   58	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
On the other hand, Table 22 lists the total risk factor for each VM. The risk associated with each 
VM is the total risk factor that associated with each VM by all the 10 vulnerabilities. This study 
concludes these results by calculating the complete risks of all 10 vulnerabilities against one VM. Then 
each VM has an equal value of risk. Next, the total risk factor calculated while adding more VMs until 10 
VMs consecutively. Thus, the calculation acquires risk values that range from 0.57 to 0.99. Then, the 
results are plotted to identify the behavior of risk factors while adding more VMs.  Each VM has a risk 
factor of 0.577 and this point is the minimum risk value obtaining from the calculations.  
After plotting the results on Figure 22, the chart demonstrates the clear behavior of the 
risk factor. It shows that risk factor is sharply increasing at the beginning. Then, the risk factor 
remains steady around a risk factor of 0.99. Figure 22 illustrates that while adding more VMs, 
the risk factor keeps increasing gradually until it is stabilized around 0.99, which is high level of 
risk. The main reason for this behavior is that some vulnerability has high value of risk factor. 
Thus, those specific vulnerabilities lead the total risk to be close to a value of 0.99 that indicates 
high level of risk.    
 
6 0.994274686 
7 0.997578418 
8 0.998975766 
9 0.99956679 
10 0.999816769 
Table 22: Risk factor per VM 
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Figure 22: Risk factor per virtual machine 
 The used framework [8] has more tasks that are needed when you perform repetitive risk 
analysis in the same organization. Risk mitigation task is one of those steps, which tend to 
develop risk treatment plan to treat the current rated risks and find the treatment possibilities. 
This plan also includes risk rating after performing risk mitigation plan to see how much risk this 
scenario still has. Moreover, the plan contains the persons who are accountable to perform the 
risk mitigation recommendations. In this paper, general recommendations section is provided in 
page 60 instead of the risk mitigation plan. The last part of the framework [8] is to perform 
monitoring and review task, which can be done after performing the risk treatment plan. This 
task requires follow-up check by the cloud provider to ensure the risk treatment plan is 
completely implemented. Then, if the risk assessor finds new issues, he/she takes an action to 
treat the incidental issues. Check and Act is the last task of the Plan, Do, Check, and Act (PDCA) 
process model [8]. Those tasks are behind the objective of this research at this moment since one 
of the major objectives of this research is to find and assess the risk provided in cloud computing 
environments.    
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5. Experimental Results 
In this study’s scenario, the test cases are applied in a cloud environment that has up to 10 
VMs. Nonetheless, most real cases would contain more than 10 VMs that perform different 
tasks. Thus, this study uses the existing results to estimate the behavior of the SLA-factors while 
adding more VMs. In cloud environment, scalability is one feature that is considered very 
beneficial to acquire more cloud resources, as you need and many cloud customers utilize this 
feature to provide more resources and ensure the service availability. As the customer utilizes 
more VMs, this study needs to ensure the behavior of the SLA factors and how the customers 
can be affected by having more cloud resources. Thus, the results are plotted in different charts 
and figures to illustrate the effects of those factors. Then, a curve fitting process is applied over 
the data to acquire the best fit of the data points. The produced line provides best fit to all the 
data points and it indicates the behavior of the SLA factors while adding more VMs. To achieve 
this task, this study uses the Matlab Curve Fitting tool [49] to produce the fitting line and all 
related figures. All the figures and discussion are provided in the following parts.  
In term of the response time, this study performs different test cases to acquire the response 
times in different circumstances. First case is to see the behavior of the response time within the 
same subnet.  Figure 23 depicts the distribution of the response time data within the same subnet 
per each VM. The response time has been calculated about 100 times for each VM. Figure 23 
demonstrates that the response time fit-line remains stable as constant line between the 0.090 and 
0.095 milliseconds.  This fit-line indicates that while increasing the VMs in the same subnet, the 
response time remains constant for all the VMs in the cloud. This test is a case-specific for 
Amazon cloud services and it depends on infrastructure features of Amazon installation  
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Figure 23: Fit-line of response time data within same subnet 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Next, the research performs another test case, which is calculating the response time from 
other availability zone owned by the cloud provider. In this case, a VM in another availability 
zone (Europe zone) is set up. Then, the resulted data are plotted in a figure to produce the best-fit 
line.  As previous case, Figure 24 illustrates the spreading of the response time data from another 
Amazon zone per each VM. The response time has been calculated about 100 times for each 
VM. Figure 24 proves that the response time fit-line remains unchanged about 0.17 second.  This 
fit-line specifies that while adding more VMs in the cloud environment, the response time 
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continues persistent for all the VMs in the cloud. Similar to the previous case, this test is a case-
specific for Amazon cloud services and it depends on infrastructure features of Amazon 
installation.  
 
Figure 24: Fit-line of response time data from another availability zone 	  	  	  
 Then, this study implements a test case to find the response time between the physical 
network at RIT and the cloud environment that resides at Amazon zone (Oregon US). The results 
are placed in a figure to generate the fit-line that fits all data points. Like to the preceding test 
cases, Figure 25 clarifies the scattering of the response time data from RIT per each VM. 
Similarly, the response time has been calculated about 100 times for each VM. Figure 25 verifies 
that the response time fit-line is constant behavior between 0.090 and 0.095 second.  This fit-line 
states that if the number of the VMs in the cloud environment increases, the response time 
remains constant for all the VMs in the cloud. Similar to the previous case, this test is a case-
	   63	  
specific for Amazon cloud services and it depends on infrastructure features of Amazon 
installation.     
 
Figure 25: Fit-line of response time data from RIT 
 The response time in the three cases is constant but it differs in the time factor since the 
response time inside the subnet is extremely fast than other two cases. Also, the other two cases 
express the significance of the physical location of the cloud resources since connecting to the 
cloud within US is faster than connecting from another Amazon’s zone outside the US.  
 Since the previous test cases use one-to-one response time, the next test case is related to 
calculate the end-to-end delay response time as done in section 4.1.4. In this case, there are two 
different scenarios. The first scenario is to assume the service request passes all the VMs and it’s 
finally fulfilled by VM #10. The last VM does not provide the customer with any feedback. The 
resulted data are plotted to get the fit-line that fits all the data points. Thus, Figure 26 illustrates 
that the fit-line is steadily increasing while adding more VMs. After the first VM, the increase 
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factor is constant through all the VMs. Figure 26 shows that if more VMs are added, the 
response time of the service request increases by a constant factor.            
 
Figure 26: End-to-end response time without feedback 	  
On the other hand, the second scenario assumes that the last VM responds with feedback 
to the customer.  Figure 27 demonstrates the behavior of the best-fit curve of the scenario. While 
the distribution of data points shows constant behavior except for the last point, the best-fit curve 
is progressively increasing. The last point that appears as outlier that affects the fit curve 
behavior is the response time for the last VM’s feedback. Thus, it is appears the response time is 
kept almost constant until a feedback task is required.   
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Figure 27: End-to-end response time with feedback 
  
 After discussing the first SLA factor in the previous part, this part discusses the second 
the SLA factor. Figure 9 shows that the total cost of cloud resources are gradually increasing 
while utilizing more cloud resources. Thus, the cloud customer needs to pay attention that using 
more cloud resources such as VMs, public IPs, cloud storage, or other computing services add 
more money to the bill. Also, the cloud customer should pay attention to charging policy since 
the pricing policy changes from cloud provider to another. For instance, Amazon AWS charges 
each VM per hour, which means if the customer uses the VM for 10 minutes only, the customer 
is charged for the whole hour.           
 Now, this part discusses the risk factor and its behavior while adding cloud resources. 
After all the results that get from section 4.3.2.2.3 are plotted, the best-fit curve that fits all the 
data points is generated. Figure 28 depicts that the fit curve is gradually increasing while adding 
more cloud resources that means adding VMs introduces more risk to the cloud environment. 
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Moreover, adding more VMs would defiantly increase the surface attack and introduce more 
risk. Thus, the risk factor increases while increasing the used cloud resources i.e. VMs.      
 
Figure 28: Best-fit curve for risk factor per VM 
  
 After this study examined the relationship between the SLA factor and cloud resources, it 
shows the relationship between the SLA factors. First of all, this research is going to study the 
relationship between risk factor versus the response time factor. Since the response time for 
individual VM is constant, in this case, this study uses end-to-end response time of a service 
request.  Figure 29 illustrates that the risk factor and response time are directly proportional to 
each other. Thus, when the response time increases, the risk factor increases respectively. 
Increasing the response time would highly lead to risk of service unavailability.         
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Figure 29: Risk factor vs. response time factor 
    
  To illustrate the relationship between those two factors, the fit-line between the two 
factors is generated to conclude the behavior of the line while adding more cloud resources. 
Figure 30 shows the fitting curve for the two factors is gradually increasing while adding more 
VMs.  
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Figure 30: Best-fit curve for risk factor vs. response time factor 
     Then, this research shows the relationship between the risk factor and cost factor. Figure 
31 expresses that if the risk factor and cost factors are directly proportional. This means that if 
the risk factor increases then, the cost factor is increasing correspondingly.    
 
Figure 31: Risk factor vs. cost factor 
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  Then, the best-fit curve that fits the resulted data points is generated. Figure 32 depicts 
the curve that estimates the future behavior of the relationship between the risk and cost factors. 
It is clear from the curve that as the risk increases, the cost factor increases too.   
 
Figure 32: Best-fit curve for risk factor vs. cost factor 
 Finally, in this part, this research states in the relationship between the response time and 
the cost factors. Similarly, the response time of an end-to-end service request case is used to 
illustrate the relationship.  Figure 33 indicates the relationship between the two factors since if 
the response time increases for all VMs, the cost factor keeps increasing respectively.  Similar as 
the previous part, the increase here is also driven by the increase factor in the number of the 
VMs.   
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Figure 33: Response time factor vs. cost factor 
    Next, the fit-line that fits data points between the response and cost factors is 
acquired. Figure 34 indicates the fitting line that estimates the scalability of the relationship 
between the response time and cost factors. It is clear that the line is gradually growing as the 
two factors keep increasing.  Thus, the relationship between those two factors is directly 
proportional. 
 
Figure 34: Fit-line for response time factor vs. cost factor  	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6. Recommendations  
This research shows the importance of the relationship between the SLA factors. After this 
study analyzes those factors, it comes up with important issues and findings. First of all, before 
any customer decides to move to a cloud environment, the customer should perform 
comprehensive analysis for the SLA factors. As seen in this research, those factors can behave 
according to different reasons. Understanding those factors and their significance would provide 
the customer with better knowledge to take decent decisions in a cloud-computing environment. 
Moreover, this research indicates that the current public cloud environments are areas of risk 
where a customer needs to think before taking any decisions. The cost factor should be 
investigated and analyzed to state its affect in an organization budget. The customer should read 
the pricing policy very carefully to understand all the cost provisions. Moreover, the customer 
should ensure how the cost factor in the SLA is met and how to measure this factor very 
carefully.  
This research states the essential role of the response time. The response time is an important 
factor to ensure the availability of the services. This research shows the effect of the physical 
location of the cloud environment and how that can affect the service request performance. Also, 
the research states that the best cloud provider should provide good response time with at least 
constant value. Ensuring the response time is part of ensuring the quality of the service (QoS) 
that is used to evaluate the SLA factors. 
Besides the response time and cost factors, this research concentrates more in risk factor 
because most of the SLA in cloud services lacks this factor. Thus, this study shows the 
importance of this factor and how it is related to other SLA factors such as response time and 
cost factors. This research concludes that the risk factor should be brought to the table of 
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negotiation between the cloud providers and their customers. The customers should engage a risk 
management team in negotiation to provide broad vision about the ambiguous areas in SLAs 
such as the risk factor. Also, the cloud providers should hire risk management team from a third 
party provider to analyze its environment regularly to build trust relation between the service and 
its customers. This includes ensuring if the cloud providers meet the compliance requirements 
for different laws and standards. The final results of the risk analysis should play a significant 
role in making the decision, negotiating, and finalizing the SLAs. Then, the cloud provider and 
customer should both ensure the implementation and monitoring of the SLA to avoid any 
disruptions or violations.          
7. Future Work 
Risk management in cloud environment has been considered an active area in cloud 
computing research recently. There are different points in the future work that may be done to 
improve or contribute to this work. First, the future work in this topic may include different SLA 
metrics and study their relationship to the risk metric. Those metrics may include trust, violation 
ratio, availability, and elasticity. Then, the future work may aim to find the relationships between 
the risk factor and those metrics. Moreover, future work may perform different studies to find the 
practical effects of the risk management process in SLA negotiation and enforcement processes. 
Since this research implements a private cloud using a public cloud provider, future work may 
implement different scenarios such as using public cloud environment or implement on-promise 
cloud environment. Then, the same steps may be performed to the new scenarios and compare 
them to mentioned scenario in this paper. Also, the future work may implement cloud service 
models such as Software as a Service (SaaS) or Platform as a Service (PaaS). Then, the same 
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steps used in this paper may be employed against those service models. Furthermore, the future 
work may include in-depth risk analysis for SLA real cases that are published by service 
provider such as Amazon.               
8. Conclusion 
In conclusions, this paper discussed some issues in cloud computing that have not been 
discussed frequently. This research implemented SLA-based risk analysis in cloud computing 
environments. The research evaluates important SLA parameters such as response time, cost, and risk 
factors. As a result, this paper indicated the relationship between the risk parameter and other SLA 
parameters such as response time and the cost. This paper declares the importance of the risk management 
requirement as an SLA parameter. Different consequences resulted from this analysis state the important 
relation between the risk factor and other SLA metrics such as the response time and cost factors. This 
paper indicates the effect of lacking risk parameter in the current SLA provided by most cloud providers. 
Also, it provides customer with risk analysis for various SLA factors and this helps the customer to make 
a better decision before moving to the cloud environment. Finally, the paper states that there are important 
relationships between all the three SLA factors and all those relationship indicate the importance of the 
risk factor in any SLA.    
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Scripts  
Response_Time_Server.pl 
/* 
By Mohammed Almathami, RIT 
This script tends to calculate the response time between two computers.  
*/ 
 
#! /usr/bin/perl 
use warnings; 
use Net::Ping; 
use Time:HiRes; 
 
# Variables 
#IP address of the target machine 
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#A loop can be used to test multiple IPs at the same time 
@hosts = ("50.112.153.2"); 
 
 
#The sum of the response time of all requests  
$sum=0; 
 
#The average of the response time  
$avg=0; 
 
#Start loop of IPs 
foreach $host (@hosts) { 
 
#for loop to send multiple TCP Ping to each machine 
for ($count = 1; $count <= 100; $count++)  
{ 
 
#Establish the packet  
$p = Net::Ping->new("syn"); 
 
#Identify the listening port on the server  
$p->port_number(99999); 
 
$p->hires(); 
 
#Send TCP Ping 
$p->ping($host); 
 
#Get the info from the ACK of the packet 
($host,$rtt,$ip) = $p->ack($host); 
  
#Convert millisecond to seconds $MS = $rtt / 1000 if needed 
$MS = $rtt; 
 
#Print the results 
print " at $count Machine's IP @ [$ip] responds in $MS seconds.\n"; 
 
#The sum of the response time  
$sum = $sum + $MS; 
 
$p->close(); 
} 
#For loop ends here 
 
#Find the average of the response time by dividing the sum of the response time by the number of the 
packets 
$avg = $sum / 100; 
 
# Print the results 
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print " The sum of the response time is: $sum seconds.\n The average of the response time is: $avg 
seconds.\n";  
 
#End of IPs 
} 
 
Listener.pl 
/* 
By Mohammed Almathami, RIT 
This script tends to listen on port 99999 on the machine that is being tested for the response time. 
*/ 
 
#!/usr/bin/perl -w  
use strict; 
use warnings; 
use IO::Socket;  
 
# Variables 
# Identify the listening port on the server  
my $PORT = 99999; 
 
#Start the listener on the machine 
my $listener = IO::Socket::INET->new( 
        Proto     => 'tcp', 
        LocalPort => $PORT, 
        Listen    => 5, 
        Reuse     => 1) 
or die "can't setup listener"; 
 
print "This machine is now listening for a TCP connection on port 99999\n"; 
 
while (my $connection = $listener->accept()) {close $connection;} 
